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Amid the growing challenges of cybersecurity, the new 
paradigm of cyber threat intelligence (or CTI) has 
gained momentum to better respond to      cyber 
threats. there has been one fundamental and very 
practical problem of information overload. 
Organizations face this problem in constructing an 
effective CTI program. We developed a cyber threat 
intelligence prototype that automatically and 
dynamically performs the correlation of business 
assets, vulnerabilities, and cyber threat information in 
a scoped setting to remediate the challenge of 
information overload. The tool that embraces 
automatization functions are frequently termed 
security orchestration, automation, and response 
(SOAR). TIME (Threat Intelligence Modeling 
Environment) conducts SOAR functionality by 
automatically repeating the full cycle of determining 
internal assets that are particularly vulnerable to 




The age of hyper-connectivity has arrived. As its 
negative consequence, there is no shortage of alarming 
stories on severe security breaches. The recent crypto-
ransomware attacks on numerous business and 
government organizations for financial extortions 
highlight just how serious cybercrimes have become. 
As the Information Technology (IT) horizon continues 
to expand, especially with the spread of mobile, IoT 
(Internet of Things), and industrial control 
technologies generally called SCADA (Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition), the attack surface 
continues to swell      This poses great challenges to 
organizations. To make the matter worse, threats 
propagate faster than threat information or threat 
feeds. This makes it difficult for defenders to keep up 
with their proliferation in a timely manner. Not 
surprisingly, cybercrimes have become a large 
underground economy sector with complex supply 
chains operating in the shadow of anonymity and 
obscurity. Amid the growing challenges, the new 
paradigm of cyber threat intelligence (or CTI) has 
gained momentum to better deal with cyber threats. 
Through CTI, an organization can better understand 
potential adversaries and predict threat/attack methods 
they will likely use. In addition,, they can build 
actionable defense models against imminent or 
looming threats. 
Amid the rise of CTI, we developed a cyber threat 
intelligence prototype that automatically and 
dynamically performs the correlation of business 
assets, vulnerabilities, and cyber threat information in 
a scoped setting called TIME (for Threat Intelligence 
Modeling Environment). TIME repeats the cycle of: 
collect internal asset data; gather vulnerability and 
threat data; correlate vulnerabilities with assets; and 
derive CTI and alerts of significant internal asset-
related vulnerabilities in a timely manner. Corporate 
assets (especially data/information assets), software 
and hardware vulnerabilities, and cyber threats are 
highly dynamic. That is, an organization’s own data 
and other assets, software and hardware 
vulnerabilities, and cyberspace threats and exploits, 
continuously evolve, which poses a real challenge to 
its defenders.  
For automatic derivation of significant CTI, the 
TIME framework takes advantage of several standards 
from the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) intended for the formalization of 
vulnerability and threat management. TIME is tightly 
coupled with the NIST Framework designed to 
improve Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. TIME 
was prompted by the dearth of modeling methods that 
effectively and efficiently embrace threat intelligence 
to find countermeasures against threats in a timely 
manner (i.e., prepare defense before a threat actor 
strikes). TIME is an effort to augment CTI analysts’ 
ability in battling cyber threats by providing 
actionable intelligence that includes such attributes as 
expected impact (e.g., benign, critical), confidence 
(e.g., low, high), and operational priority. The 
modeling method is oriented to facilitate: forward-
looking and proactive (rather than reactive) problem 
solving; timely decision making and deployment of 
countermeasures; prioritization in risk remediation to 
face a large number of attack vectors and agile 
adversaries; active remediation of significant risks 
rather than passive regulatory compliance; and 
collaborative problem solving through threat 
information and intelligence sharing.  





The key contribution of this project is that      
traditional risk assessments, based on the asset-threat-
vulnerability triangulation, can be automated. If 
necessary, the automation can be scaled vertically and 
horizontally along with an organization’s defense line. 
Although the automation of threat intelligence 
discovery is scoped in this project, we underscore that 
it can be scaled to the enterprise-level. TIME’s 
approach has a potential to reduce attack surfaces, 
fortify defense-in-depth through improved CTI 
capabilities, decrease the cycle time of decision 
making, relieve CTI analysts from information 
overload, and increase agility of cyber defense 
capabilities among others. 
 
2. Background: The Rise of CTI 
 
Threat intelligence represents information 
actionable by a particular organization (not just any 
threat information) as it is particularly relevant to its 
context [1] [2]. There is a great deal of cyber threat 
information out there. An organization only needs a 
relevant subset of it. If adversaries are taking 
advantage of a particular vulnerability in the      Linux 
OS to penetrate the organizational defense, this threat 
is not actionable for a business if it purely relies on 
Windows OS. Threat intelligence should be 
contextually relevant and be driven by evidence-based 
knowledge to quickly and accurately address dangers 
to an organization in an anticipatory manner.  
The legendary strategist and philosopher Sun Tzu, 
in his transcendent book -- The Art of War, states that 
if one knows herself and also her enemies, she will 
always win; but, if she does not know her enemies, the 
chance of winning drops considerably. The 
importance of knowing enemies, as an example of 
situational awareness [3] [1], is also paramount in 
cybersecurity when the battlefield is cyberspace and 
organizations play defense against invisible 
aggressors. Traditionally, the situational awareness 
aspect of knowing your enemies has received little 
attention in organizational risk management. Sun 
Tzu’s 2400-year-old lesson seems to offer a clue as to 
why traditional cybersecurity efforts have not been 
fully successful against increasingly sophisticated 
adversaries. The logic is straightforward. As threats 
directly cause damages to organizations, they should 
drive much of a firm's efforts (e.g., resource 
allocations, prioritization of countermeasures, and 
etc.) in forming the defense strategy. There is evidence 
that the orientations of organizational cybersecurity 
efforts have not been balanced.  
First, traditional approaches and defense solutions 
have been primarily reactive (e.g., fixing 
vulnerabilities when breaches occur). They have 
focused on covering a broad spectrum of threats in a 
generalized manner, which typically includes      
setting up general defense/packet filtering rules on 
host/network firewalls, implementing intrusion 
detection systems, and offering general user security 
training. All of which are largely aligned with the 
traditional defense paradigm [1]. The generalized 
measures are extremely important. Numerous 
publicized incidents underscore this approach. The 
‘prepare ourselves’ against unknown/less-known 
enemies through general defense measures and then 
‘wait and see’ hoping for nothing to happen, is not 
enough. This approach is able to fight off serious 
attacks. The more proactive, anticipatory, and 
targeted counter moves are, the more likely they are 
able to preempt threats and to lower security failure 
rates [4]. It has been repeatedly pointed out that the 
traditional defense approach is prone to expose 
organizations to vulnerabilities in dealing with more 
sustained, serious forms of threats/attacks, such as 
advanced persistent threats [5] [6] [7].  
Second, organizations have been placing much 
more emphasis on regulatory compliance. This 
naturally causes the threat aspect of risk management 
to receive much less attention [8]. In scholarly 
research, compliance is one of the most frequented 
themes. Current studies examine compliance from 
such perspectives as security standards [9]; Sarbanes-
Oxley Act [10]; and organizational policies [11] [12]. 
Complying with the laws, regulations, standards, 
directives, and policies is so fundamental that failure 
can result in crippling consequences. It also puts 
accountability on non-complying organizations or 
employees. This forces them to do a better job in 
protecting key assets (e.g., health records). However, 
compliance is a necessary condition and hardly 
sufficient for safety from threats. In fact, compliance 
may engender a false sense of security when 
organizations need to do much more than simply 
fulfilling the compliance requirements. 
Third, popular risk modeling 
frameworks/methods are designed to facilitate the 
know yourself process (i.e., understand internal 
weaknesses and risks). This largely fails to include 
threat intelligence elements in guiding organizational 
efforts. Traditional threat modeling is done in terms of 
asset-based, software-based, or attacker-based, and it 
is not difficult to observe their orientations toward 
internal risk assessment/discovery [13]. Asset-based 
threat modeling (e.g., OCTAVE [Operationally 
Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability 
EvaluationSM]) is internal asset focused as well. 
Software-based threat modeling (e.g., OWASP [Open 
Web Application Security Project[) aims to address 
security issues associated with software applications 
deployed. The attacker-based threat modeling that 
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factors in the attackers’ motivation, such as STRIDE, 
which is an acronym for six threat categories: 
Spoofing identity, Tampering with data, Repudiation 
threats, Information disclosure, Denial of service and 
Elevation of privileges, places much focus on software 
applications.  
CTI is a movement to strike a balance between 
‘know your invisible enemies’ and traditional 
cybersecurity management. It tends to put more 
weight in understanding internal weaknesses or 
vulnerabilities [1]. CTI goes beyond conventional 
risk-management orientations designed to improve 
‘general readiness’ against known or unknown threats. 
It does this by remedying internal weaknesses or 
vulnerabilities [14]. Knowing an organization’s 
enemies demands anticipatory preparations based on 
the acquired knowledge of adversaries (e.g., 
motivations) and TTPs (techniques, tactics, and 
procedures) they use. With the realization that the 
general security readiness approaches are not enough 
to effectively mitigate threats, organizations have 
increasingly embraced CTI [15] [16]. 
 
3. Related Works: SOAR  
 
A special challenge of building a CTI program at 
an organization is information overload. More 
organizations are increasingly adopting CTI 
technologies and commercial CTI services [7] [17]. 
The adoptions are particularly in sectors such as 
finance, aerospace, defense, government, and IT.  
They have a lot to lose from cyber breaches. There has 
been one fundamental and very practical problem of 
information overload organizations face in 
constructing an effective CTI program. There is the 
inundation of threat (e.g., indicators of compromise 
such as malware hashes, IPs, domains, DNS) and 
vulnerability (e.g., defects in software design) 
information from open-source sites (called OSINT) 
and subscription-based services (e.g., IBM’s x-Force) 
[18].  
The information overload situation gets worse as 
CTI practitioners also need to examine (e.g., correlate) 
the log and alert data produced by internal network 
nodes and defense systems such as the firewall and 
intrusion detection system (IDS). There are practical 
challenges for the CTI analyst to effectively process 
this much internal and external data. For this reason, 
large companies maintain a CTI team [1][16]. Further, 
practically the only way of handling the information 
overload situation is the smart automation of CTI 
activities [19] [20]. There are however significant 
challenges in automating CTI. This includes the 
feeding of unstructured data from different CTI data 
sources and heterogeneity of data attributes gathered 
from various systems deployed. 
Despite the challenges, the practical need and 
urgency for automating cybersecurity functions drives 
the rise of the security orchestration, automation and 
response system (SOAR). Although the SOAR 
system’s architecture continues to evolve, it includes 
various system features. This includes the integration 
of heterogeneous security systems, orchestration of 
workflows, event management, automation, and case 
management [19]. This way SOAR can improve 
security analysts’ or SOC’s performance in various 
dimensions such as time to detect, time to respond, 
time to qualify and time to investigate [19] [20]. Amid 
the constant influx of large data to analyze, 
organizations are increasingly adopting AI/ML for 
automating cybersecurity functions [21]. The 
automation can be implemented in many ways. This 
includes anomaly detection and predictive intelligence 
[22] [23], alert triage [24], threat intelligence 
collection [25], event classification [26], event 
correlation [23], activity and event prioritization [26] 
[27], and incidence response [28] [21]. [20] 
summarized various SOAR solutions commercially 
available and their platform capabilities in automating 
CTI, identification, containment, eradication, and 
recovery functions. 
 
4. High-Level Systems Architecture 
 
We develop knowledge and build an artifact to 
tackle a problem the cybersecurity industry faces -- the 
inundation of data/information. This data needs to be 
processed in time to uncover actionable CTI 
particularly germane to an organization. An obvious 
approach to the information overload problem is to 
automate the CTI discovery process [18]. Despite its 
side effects noted, our research aims to develop TIME 
to “automate” the correlation between vulnerability, 
threat information and assets of a firm. The 
development is intended to implement a function that 
could become an essential element of SOAR. 
To facilitate the efforts, TIME is tightly coupled 
with Security Content Automation Protocol (or SCAP) 
standards from NIST. Various open standards have 
been announced under the umbrella concept of SCAP, 
a multi-purpose framework aiming to automate 
security controls. This includes vulnerability, threat 
management, and compliance checking. There are 
several well-known SCAP standards. CVSS 
(Common Vulnerability Scoring System) and CWSS 
(Common Weakness Scoring System) rate the severity 
of software vulnerabilities and weaknesses 
discovered. CVE (Common Vulnerabilities 
Enumeration) lists publicly known software 
vulnerabilities. CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern 
Enumeration and Classification) is a comprehensive 
dictionary of known attack patterns cyber adversaries 
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use to exploit chosen targets. CCE (Common 
Configuration Enumeration) recommends secure 
configuration of software products and helps identify 
system misconfigurations. CWE (Common Weakness 
Enumeration) is a dictionary of software weakness 
types. CPE (Common Platform Enumeration) 
provides a structured naming scheme for software 
packages and hardware devices. There are other 
standardization efforts such as the STIX language for 
CTI sharing. While they are intended to facilitate 
automation of the CTI discovery and sharing 
processes, cybersecurity practitioners still heavily rely 
on the manual processing of threat and vulnerability 
data to uncover relevant CTI [20]. This work is an 
effort to partly fill the void. 
Figure 1 summarizes a high-level view of TIME’s 
system components and external data sources that 
continuously supply CTI-derivable data to TIME. The 
TIME framework can be adapted to integrate with 
multiple CTI sources, whether they are open-source or 
not. The current implementation was developed and 
tested using AT&T’s AlienVault Open Threat 
Exchange repository and IBM’s X-Force Exchange. 
The AT&T and IBM sites provide highly recent cyber 
threat and vulnerability information that can be pulled 
by the TIME system. Integration with other CTI 
sources comes down to understanding what the 
repository provides in their CTI and the structure of 
the information returned when CTI from the source 
repository is retrieved. 
TIME also scans the local network and its end 
points (i.e., client and server computers) to obtain 
software and hardware assets deployed on each device 
(i.e., endpoint). TIME has logic to use a three-way 
triangulation and correlation logic among threats and 
vulnerabilities. These are reported by external sources. 
Software and hardware assets installed on endpoints  
 
have a logic to automatically derive internal assets that 
are pronounced to have vulnerabilities by AT&T’s 
AlienVault and IBM’s x-Force. For the automation, 
TIME also downloads data (e.g., CVE, CPE, CAPEC) 
from SCAP database sources and stores them in the 
local database. Additionally, TIME has a GUI module 
(Grafana-based) that displays the dashboard-style 
summary of alert data if there is a significant 
vulnerability found from an existing asset.  
Data from AT&T’s AlienVault and IBM’s x-
Force Exchange are much more dynamic than SCAP 
reference sources. Their threat (e.g., IP, malware hash) 
and vulnerability (e.g., newly found Windows 
vulnerability) information is more frequently updated 
whenever there is new information. In contrast, 
changes in SCAP reference data (similar to 
dictionaries) remain relatively more static. 
5. Research Method 
 
At the high-level, the objective of this research is 
to empirically prove the technical feasibility of 
automating the following process through a proof of 
concept: (1) periodically downloads vulnerability and 
threat data from two external sources (AT&T’s 
AlienVault and IBM x-Force), (2) identify records 
related to a software vulnerability or vulnerabilities 
and extract essential information, (3) pull software and 
hardware asset information from the end-points of a 
local organization, and (4) correlate the results of (2), 
(3), and SCAP standards to determine local assets 
particularly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. The 
information of SW and HW vulnerabilities of internal 
assets are tied to the CVE database. To develop the 
TIME prototype, a number of artifacts have been 
produced to facilitate the prototype design and 
implementation while undertaking the project. They 
include: (1) data flow diagram, (2) entity relationship  
diagram, (3) a Postgres database, (4) metadata of 
database tables and attributes, (5) pseudo codes, (6) 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between the TIME framework and external data sources 
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various scripts including APIs and database queries, 
and (7) graphical user interface for alerting threats and 
vulnerabilities in a dashboard style. 
 
6. TIME System Modules  
 
To enable the automated alert of vulnerable assets 
(e.g., applications, operating system) and its possible 
attack vectors (as possible threats), the TIME system 
consists of a number of input components and they are 
summarized in Figure 2. These components are 
conveniently categorized into layers and described in 
this section. 
 
6.1 SCAP Database Layer 
 
The SCAP layer represents external databases of 
different SCAP standards. These include CVE, CWE, 
CPE, CAPEC, and ATT&CK. The ATT&CK 
framework is a knowledge base of tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs) used by cyber attackers. 
Although not a SCAP standard, ATT&CK offers rich 
perspectives in understanding how a particular 
vulnerability could be exploited by adversaries. The 
CVE standard includes CVSS ratings. They are 
reference databases that enable the extraction of CTI 
based on the correlation of CVE identifier(s) from 
online sources (e.g., AlienVault) and CPE identifier of 
an internal asset.  
 
6.2 Threat/Vulnerability/SCAP DB Update 
Layer 
 
The threat/vulnerability/SCAP update layer 
includes functions that routinely poll online sources 
(i.e., AT&T AlienVault, IBM x-Force, and NIST) and      
downloads new threat and vulnerability updates. They 
are in the form of CTI reports. It also updates the 
SCAP databases. The TIME framework obtains 
batches of CTI reports every 2 hours (configurable) 
from the AT&T AlienVault and IBM x-Force 
repository. In AT&T AlienVault, the CTI report is 
provided in the form of ‘pulses.’ The pulse represents 
a collection of Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) 
related to potentially malicious activities. Pulses are 
created by the AlienVault’s research team and other 
community members of Open Threat Exchange (or 
OTX). OTX is a threat data sharing platform. 
Information obtained from NIST’s SCAP sources is 
populated to the backend CVE, CVSS, CPE, and 
ATT&CK to assist in the production of alerts powered 
by TIME's internal correlation logic. The backend also 
stores CWE and CAPEC html views for offline 
viewing to provide reference information that 
supplements a particular alert.  
The CTI report from online sources (e.g., AT&T 
AlienVault) includes information pertaining to threats 
discovered in the wild (i.e., world wide web) up to a 
few months before the report was released. This 
information contains (1) the name of the malware 
tool(s) and/or the threat actors and (2) the general 
 
 
Figure 2. TIME system components and function modules 
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indicators of compromise associated with the threat. 
These indicators of compromise include CVE 
identifiers, file hashes, IP addresses, hostnames,  
domain names, URLs, and other signature-based 
components. These assist security analysts in the 
detection, mitigation, and removal of threats in their 
local environments.  
 
6.3 Internal Asset Layer 
 
The internal asset layer scans the endpoints 
(clients and servers) over the network and gathers 
asset data (i.e., applications, operating systems, and 
hardware) per device. The only requirement is that 
each installed asset is captured and parsed to obtain 
product information, version information, 
manufacturer/vendor information, and system 
architecture. TIME includes a functional module to 
‘convert’ the obtained data to their Common Platform 
Enumeration (CPE)-compliant, well-formed named 
strings, and store them into a database. The current 
implementation of the asset information collection 
module was developed for and tested on MS Windows 
10 endpoints using a PowerShell script that collected 
system information, formatted it according to the CPE 
specification, saved the information locally, and 
finally sent the information to the TIME backend 
server for further processing. The files created for 
sending to the backend server included the asset 
device name. This is a unique identifier provided 
within the system information for the device. To 
continuously monitor for new installations, a schedule 
can be established to either (a) remind for a manual run 
of the script necessary to collect the information or (b) 
automatically run a script that will collect the 
information and subsequently send it to the TIME 
backend. 
 
6.4 CTI Extraction Layer 
 
The CTI extraction layer derives actionable CTI 
by correlating threat, vulnerability, and internal asset 
data, and by providing related reference information 
(if requested by CTI analysts) through SCAP 
databases. The TIME framework focuses on using the 
CPE and CVE standards for associating vulnerability 
information from X-Force and AlienVault with 
applications, operating systems, and hardware assets 
installed on the internal client or server device. In 
producing CTI alerts based on the TIME’s correlation 
 
Figure 3: Dashboard views of an asset vulnerability for threat alert 
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logic, the CVE identifier (e.g., CVE-2021-3462: A 
privilege escalation vulnerability in Lenovo Power 
Management Driver) obtained from online sources 
plays a triggering role. 
The module parses three key pieces of 
information from the online CTI report and 
temporarily stores them for analysis. First, the CVE 
identifier(s) from the CTI report is used to query the 
backend CVE/CPE association table. All CPEs 
associated with the CVE identifier are obtained and 
stored temporarily in a list data structure. Second, the 
module iterates through each CPE in the list, and 
compares them against CPEs associated with local 
device assets. If a match is found, the module will 
create an alert table that will include the CTI report, 
the CVE identifier from the CTI report, the threats 
and/or malware tools from the online CTI report, and 
the local device that contains the vulnerable 
installation. The alert allows CTI practitioners to 
become aware of local device assets with vulnerable 
installations as mentioned in the CTI report. It then 
provides them with relevant information to begin 
mitigating the risk immediately. Third, during the alert 
creation, the module also proceeds to obtain the 
relevant CWE, CAPEC, and ATT&CK information 
related to the CVE identifier(s) obtained from the CTI 
report (i.e., pulse). This process allows the system to 
automate the process of gathering known information 
about a specific vulnerability and constructing views 
related to that information on demand.  
 
6.5 Graphical Interface Layer 
 
Finally, the GUI-enabled interaction layer 
organizes the alert and other related information. It 
then presents it to the CTI analysts in a dashboard 
style. Figure 3 demonstrates sample alert screenshots 
produced in a dashboard style for CTI analysts. 
 
7. TIME Development  
 
The overview of TIME’s development and the 
testing platform is provided in Figure 4. An overview 
of the  technologies utilized for the TIME system 
development is provided below. The TIME framework 
backend was developed on a Linux machine, running 
Ubuntu Server 18.04.5, with 64 GB of RAM (as a 
Virtual Machine). PostgreSQL 10.0 for Linux was the 
database used to develop the backend framework for 
TIME. Python 3.8.2 and GCC 7.5.0 were used to 
develop the scripts and compile code on the server. 
PowerShell 5 Desktop Edition was used to create the 
script for gathering Windows endpoint-installed 
software and installed hardware product identifying 
information. Grafana open-source software was used 
to generate dashboard views for the TIME framework 
backend. Researchers used OpenVPN Connect, 
PuTTY, and WinSCP to remotely connect to and 
develop the TIME framework server 
The testing environment was established on the 
same subnet as the development server. TIME was 
tested using MS Windows 10 Build 1909 Win32NT. 
Three virtual Windows 10 machines were created as 
endpoints to test framework capability. The same 
version of Windows was installed on all three virtual 
machines. Each Windows machine had various 
software products installed and varying configurations 
to make each device appear unique during testing,. and 
to  evaluate the overall functionality of the various 
parts of the framework. All installed products were 
common installations found on Windows 10 devices. 
The computer systems used in validating TIME were 
all deployed via the VMWare hypervisor (see Figure 
4). 
The TIME server includes several components in 
a Linux environment. TIME functionality was coded 
in Python, an interpreted, object-oriented, high-level 
programming language. Postgres Database was used 
to store all the threat, vulnerability, and asset data 
within the TIME Asset Repository. The TIME Asset 
Repository is where all PC clients aggregate their asset 
information after the scripts are executed. Once the 
data from the scripts are uploaded, it is then imported 
into the TIME Postgres Database.  
The PC Client 2 and Client 3 Virtual Machines are 
installed with Windows 10 and various applications 
for simulating asset data. This asset data will 
eventually be loaded into the database server. PC 
Client 1 Virtual Machine shares the same functionality 
as PC Clients 2 and Client 3, except for the added 
Grafana functionality that allows for displaying TIME 
solutions in a dashboard environment for easy 
visualization (See Figure 4). Grafana is accessed via 
web browsers and has direct connectivity to TIME 
data in the Postgres Database Server. 
 
8. Discussion & Conclusion  
 
8.1 TIME Performance 
 
When there are practical difficulties in deriving 
advanced CTI by automatically correlating threats, 
vulnerabilities, and internal assets, the focus of the 
project was empirically showing its technical 
feasibility. In this proof-of-concept, the performance 
assessment evaluates whether TIME can successfully 
conduct the life cycle of all necessary activities in 
automation. This includes downloading CTI data from 
external sources, and identifying attributes with CVE 
information and other important items included in the 
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record. It also includes determining software platforms 
affected by CVE, gathering asset data, and converting 
them into well-formed CPE records. It also includes 
matching external data with CPE-compliant internal 
assets. Another step includes deriving additional 
references from SCAP databases when significant 
vulnerabilities of internal assets are found based on 
recursive DB queries. Lastly, it includes producing 
and displaying alerts of the highly vulnerable assets 
and supporting information (e.g., severity of 
vulnerability, related ATT&CK information). In the 
repeated empirical tests, when live external source 
data relevant to simulated internal assets are 
downloaded, TIME was able to automate the whole 




The resulting TIME system has several merits. 
First, growing cyberattacks underscore that threat 
modeling should fortify its effectiveness and relevance 
by adding actionable intelligence components and 
TIME explores a potential solution. Threat modeling 
is a process used by security planners to assist in 
preparing security measures for protecting systems, 
networks, and/or assets. There are three primary 
approaches of threat modeling: software-centric, 
asset-centric, and attacker-centric. Their limitations 
have been noted [13]. Today, attacks are coming from 
every angle with various motives and consequences. 
When embracing threat intelligence derived from 
various objects (e.g., critical assets, adversary’s TTPs, 
vulnerabilities), subjects (e.g., threat actors and 
profiles), and processes (e.g., attack procedures) have 
become a crucial success condition of threat 
remediation. As related, there is a dearth of guidance 
in using threat intelligence to guard organizations by: 
uncovering intelligence from a multitude of large data 
sources; automating the intelligence gathering process 
and prioritizing threats; handling variances in data 
quality and relevancy of intelligence; and validating 
third-party intelligence and false positives. TIME 
presents a potential solution path to the problems.  
Whereas traditional approaches in architecting a 
defense strategy have been primarily reactive (i.e., 
fixing vulnerabilities when breaches occur), TIME 
promotes proactive and anticipatory defense. 
Numerous publicized incidents repeatedly highlight 
the ‘wait and see’ approach after deploying defense 
measures (e.g., firewall, anti-virus, software patches). 
This approach is not sustainable anymore as it is 
unable to fend off serious attacks. A more proactive 
stance is necessary to preempt threats and to lower 
security failure rates. The traditional defense paradigm 
has become less effective, exposing an organization to 
more vulnerabilities in dealing with dangerous 
advanced persistent threats [5], composite/blended 
attacks [7], and multistage attacks [6]. The TIME 
methodology demonstrates the potential to contribute 
to the organization’s cyber defense initiatives by 
suggesting a solution path to reduce attack surfaces; 
fortify defense in depth through improved intelligence 





















Figure 4. Architectural view of TIME development & test platform 
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